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Abstract
I put forward a concise and intuitive formula for the calculation
of the valuation for a good in the presence of the expectation that
further, related, goods will soon become available. This valuation is
tractable in the sense that it does not require the explicit resolution
of the consumers life-time problem.
JEL classication: D01, D03, D11, D91.
Keywords: distributed choice, quasi-linear utility, value for money.
1 Introduction
The literature on price determination generally treats an agents valuation of
an indivisible object as an exogenous parameter. But where does this value
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come from? Suppose we make the brave assumption that the agent knows
by how much his utility would increase relative to any given status quo in case
he obtained the good. It is still unclear how a boundedly rational agent
would incorporate into his valuation the positive or negative synergies
with other goods, which he might obtain later but consumes together with
the object in question.
Consider the following scenario: our agent is about to participate in a
trading mechanism where he possibly can obtain good A. The di¢ culty he
faces is that there exists a good1 B, which will become available later2 and
is not want independent of A: the utility derived from owning A depends
on whether or not the agent will own B as well. Of course, the ideal way
to resolve this problem would be to make a joint decision on the purchase
of A and B. However, it is often the case that this is not possible: at the
time of the opportunity to buy A it may well be that the price (or even the
availability) of B is not yet known (at least to the agent), and as a result the
agent cannot predict with certainty whether he will end up owning B.
Of course, an  impractical alternative would be to solve the agents
entire stochastic life-time problem. Barring that, surprisingly, a tractable
solution to this basic problem is not known within the standard context of
consumer choice. The reason for that is the straight jacket imposed on us
by the universally accepted view of the consumer problem (due to Hicks and
Allen, 1934), which frames it as utility maximization subject to a budget
constraint: even if  and this is a big if  our agent knew his budget for
buying A and B; he would only be able to satisfy his budget constraint in
1To simplify the equations, we consider a single alternative good. The generalization
to many di¤erent potential baskets is straightforward.
2For simplicity, we do not model uncertainty over the time when B becomes available,
and also assume no discounting.
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expectation, which will generically lead to an ex post suboptimal decision.3
Recently, Friedman and Sákovics (2014) developed an alternative model
of (tractable) consumer choice,4 based on the Marshallian concept of the
marginal utility of money, , that can be dened as the slope of the (life-time)
indirect utility function evaluated at the current wealth. According to them,
the pecuniary connection between the current and future choices is a trade-o¤
rather than a constraint, and  that can be learned and/or approximated 
is the measure of it. Thus, instead of maxu(x) s.t. p  x  m; they advocate
maxu(x) p  x: A nice thing about the resulting quasi-linear utility is that
it is well suited to handle a probabilistic problem as above.
Before turning to the model with multiple goods, it is worthwhile to
ponder the implications of the quasi-linear foundation of valuation for a single
item. Recall that the valuation v of an object A is typically dened implicitly
by u(A;m   v) = u(0;m); where m is the money holding and we ignore
the additional arguments in the (not fully specied) utility function u. By
contrast, from the quasi-linear approach it is immediate that the explicit
value is v = (u(A)   u(0))=; and also the utility function becomes clearly
understood as the utility derived from the basket of goods considered together
with A in the subproblem that denes .
The decomposition of v into a utility factor and a value of money factor
has useful consequences. For example, we can endogenize v without requir-
ing the consumer to change her taste (u(:)). In other words, we can make
willingness to pay dependent on the circumstances such as reference prices
maintaining the objects utility value, and hence welfare, unchanged. Pre-
viously, in order to introduce welfare neutral distortions, researchers needed
3See Sákovics (2011) for a model where the budget constraint is satisedfor a mis-
perceived, and therefore incorrect, (but xed) price, also leading to an ex post under- or
overspend.
4For the corresponding theory of revealed preference see Sákovics (2013).
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to resort to an as ifapproach, where it was counterfactually assumed that
it was the perception of prices that was distorted.5 Using the moneysworth
demand function developed by Friedman and Sákovics (2014), all we need is
a discrete change in  to achieve the same behavior while preserving welfare.
2 The main result and its derivation
Let u(A;B) denote the (incremental) utility of obtaining both A and B,
u(A;B) the utility of obtaining A but not B; etc. Let the price of good X
be denoted by pX : Also let FB(:) denote the cumulative distribution function
of the agents belief about the price of B. Finally, assume that the mar-
ginal utility of money in the continuation following the decisions over A and
B, ; is approximately constant within the range of prices considered.6 In
sum, u(:; :); pA; FB(:) and  are the only exogenous parameters of the agents
decision problem.
Denote by (BjA) the probability the agent assigns to buying B if he
also purchases A and by (BjA) if he does not. Also, write the expected
price of B; conditional on buying both it and A, as E(pBjB;A): Then using
the quasi-linear set-up of Friedman and Sákovics (2014) described above 
we can write the agents expected utility if he buys A for pA as
(BjA) (u(A;B)  (pA + E(pBjB;A)) + (BjA)
 
u(A;B)  pA

:
Similarly, his expected utility in case he renounces to buy A normalizing
u(A;B) to zero is
(BjA)  u(A;B)  E(pBjB;A) :
5See Sákovics (2011).
6In other words, the decisions are over small/inexpensive items. To model decisions
over a wider range of prices we could not maintain the quasi-linear approximation and
would need to work with a range of s.
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By denition, the agents valuation for A; vA; is the price of A at which he
is indi¤erent between the two expected values:
vA =
(BjA)u(A;B) + (BjA)u(A;B)  (BjA)u(A;B)

+
(BjA)E(pBjB;A)  (BjA)E(pBjB;A):
Next, note that the agent will eventually purchase B if his direct gain in
utility evaluated at that point in time exceeds the shadow utility value of
the monetary cost: u(:; B) u(:; B)  pB:We can thus write the conditional
valuations for B as u(A;B) u(A;B)

= vAB and
u(A;B)

= vAB:
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We are now ready express the conditional purchasing probabilities as func-
tions of the exogenous parameters: (BjA) = FB
 
vAB

; (BjA) = 1 FB(vAB)
and (BjA) = FB(vAB): Finally, E(pBjB;A) =
R vAB
0 zdFB(z)
FB(v
A
B)
and E(pBjB;A) =R vAB
0 zdFB(z)
FB(v
A
B)
: Pulling everything together, we have
vA =
u(A;B)

+ FB(v
A
B)v
A
B   FB(vAB)vAB +
Z vAB
vAB
zdFB(z): (1)
Note that the last three terms of (1) can be interpreted as the result of
integration by parts. Reverse integratingthem we obtain our main result:
Proposition 1. The valuation for good A before the agent learns the price
of good B is given by
vA =
u(A;B)

+
Z vAB
vAB
FB(z)dz:
The rst term is the straightforward valuation that the agent would have
if he knew that good B was not available (or if A and B were want inde-
pendent). The second term captures the interdependence between A and B.
For example, if A and B are complements, then vAB > v
A
B (the utility gained
7Note that if A and B were want independent then vAB would equal v
A
B :
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by obtaining B is greater if the agent also owns A) and the second term is
positive unless B is priced out of the agents reach: FB(vAB) = FB(v
A
B) = 0:
That is, if it is possible that a complementary good becomes available in
the (near) future, the valuation of the currently considered good increases.
Naturally, we have the opposite result for substitutes.
The size of the additional e¤ect depends on the distribution of pB: The
more likely it is that pB is low say, in terms of rst-order stochastic dom-
inance of the distribution functions  the more likely it is that B will be
bought and it a¤ects the valuation for A: In the extreme case, when the
agent is certain that he will buy good B, FB(vAB) = FB(v
A
B) = 1 and the
second term becomes vAB   vAB = u(A;B) u(A;B) u(A;B) . Substituting back, we
have vA =
u(A;B) u(A;B)

; as we should.
One interpretation of the Proposition is that we have identied the error
term, in case the agent or the modeler(!) mistakenly treats the purchase of
A as a separable in terms of want independence (sub)problem. The other
side of the same coin is to see that when a (sub)problem is not separable, a
virtual income e¤ectcomes into play even with quasi-linear utilities.
3 Conclusion
In this note we have derived the valuation for a good at a time when the
conditions under which another, related, good will be available is not yet
known. The su¢ cient statistic for the rest-of-life problem was the marginal
utility for money, which can be learned and/or estimated. This result can
be interpreted as a tractable micro-foundation for using a valuation as a
parameter in these circumstances.
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